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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 890309 
v. : 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, I Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of criminal homicide, 
murder in the first degree, a capital felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1990). This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1990) 
because the appeal is from a district court in a criminal case 
involving a capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court violate defendant's rights to 
due process, counsel, and a fair and impartial jury by the way in 
which it conducted jury voir dire? Trial judges have broad 
discretion in conducting voir dire and their decisions will not 
be overturned barring an abuse of discretion which rises to the 
level of reversible error. Utah R. Crim. P. 18(b) (1990); State 
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988). Appellate courts will 
presume that discretion was properly exercised by the trial court 
unless the record clearly shows the contrary. Goddard v. 
Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984). 
2. Is the aggravating circumstance found in Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(h) limited to Utah convictions only for 
felonies involving violence; alternatively, does that section 
violate due process? The trial court's legal conclusion that the 
statute is constitutional and was applicable to this case is 
reviewed under a correction of error standard. City of 
Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990). Statutes are endowed with a 
"strong presumption of validity and will not be declared 
unconstitutional unless there is no reasonable basis upon which 
they can be construed as conforming to constitutional 
requirements." In re Criminal Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct., 754 
P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988). 
3. Did the trial court err in denying defendant's 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or his motion to 
be sentenced under the next lower category on the basis that the 
evidence did not support a finding of the requisite culpable 
mental state? Both of these issues are matters of discretion 
with the trial court; consequently, they should be reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 
1133, 1135 (Utah 1989). This issue is predicated on a review of 
the jury's determination that defendant had the requisite mental 
state to support conviction for first degree murder. That 
determination is to be accorded the deference due a jury finding 
and this "Court should only interfere when . . . reasonable men 
could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt." State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980). 
4. Did defendant preserve for appeal his claim that he 
was denied his right to counsel and access to the courts on the 
basis that he was denied access to his counsel while in the Salt 
Lake County Jail? It is defendant's obligation to timely and 
specifically object to claims of error at trial in order to 
preserve the issue for appeal, and this Court will not address an 
issue for the first time on appeal. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 
1141, 1144 (Utah 1989). It is also defendant's obligation to 
provide an adequate record supporting allegations of error. If 
he fails to do so, this Court "simply cannot rule on a question 
which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by 
the record." State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 
1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983). 
5. Did the court err in denying defendant's requested 
jury instructions? A trial court's decision to reject a proposed 
jury instruction may either be a matter of discretion or a legal 
conclusion. Discretionary matters are reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 
1989). Legal conclusions are reviewed under a correction of 
error standard. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 
516 (Utah), cert, denied, 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990). 
6. Did the court err in denying defendant's motion for 
new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence? "[T]he 
decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of discretion 
with the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear 
abuse of that discretion." State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 
(Utah 1985); see also State v. Beach, 661 P.2d 961, 961 (Utah 
1983). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies are included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 23, 1986, defendant, Steven Ray James, was 
charged with criminal homicide, murder in the first degree, a 
capital felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1990) 
(Record [hereafter R.] at 1A). On May 6, 1987, defendant filed a 
motion for change of venue (R. at 127). When that motion was 
denied (R. at 605), defendant took an interlocutory appeal and 
this Court ordered that the trial be moved (R. at 681-87). 
Upon the stipulation of the parties, the trial was 
moved to the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County on 
April 26, 1989 (R. at 703-705). The matter came on for jury 
trial in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Pat B. Brian, district judge, presiding (R. at 
718). Trial was held May 1-4 and 8-11, 1989, and defendant was 
found guilty as charged (R. at 718-25 and 1036). On May 15, 
1989, the jury heard evidence regarding an aggravating 
circumstance and found by special verdict that defendant had 
previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat 
of violence to a person (R. at 1045 and transcript of phase II of 
the trial, May 15, 1989). 
On May 17, 1989, defendant filed a motion to record his 
conviction as the next lower category of offense, and a motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (R. at 1046-49). At the 
sentencing hearing held that day, the court denied both motions 
and sentenced defendant to life in prison (R. at 1236 and 
transcript of sentencing hearing, May 17, 1989)• 
Defendant filed a motion for new trial on May 26, 1989, 
alleging that one of the jurors did not believe that defendant 
had intentionally killed the child, and that newly discovered 
evidence about the door lock on defendant's car necessitated a 
new trial (R. at 1240-41). On May 30, 1989, defendant moved to 
amend the new trial motion to add the allegation that his due 
process rights were violated because the prosecutors did not have 
authority to prosecute him (R. at 1252-53)• The court conducted 
a hearing on the motion and amended motion and denied them on 
August 7, 1989 (R. at 1326-31). 
Although nothing appears in the pleadings file to 
indicate that defendant filed another motion for new trial, 
supplemental transcripts for hearings conducted April 5 and 17, 
1990, indicate that there was a second motion (Transcript of 
proceedings, April 5, 1990 and April 17, 1990). That motion was 
based on allegations that a witness was found who would 
corroborate defendant's testimony that he had never admitted 
killing the child to an inmate in the Cache County Jail 
(Transcript of April 5, 1990 at 2). The court denied that second 
motion for new trial on April 17, 1990 (Transcript of April 17, 
1990 at 16). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In January of 1985, Victoria DeLeon met defendant at 
their work in Hyrum, Utah (R. 1351 at 302 and R. 1355 at 977).1 
They moved in together in Logan, Utah approximately February 15 
or 22, 1985 (R. 1351 at 303 and R. 1355 at 978). They 
subsequently moved to Preston, Idaho and lived for a year in a 
home owned by Don Lawhan (R. 1351 at 303-304). On May 22, 1986, 
a baby, Steven Roy James, was born to them (R. 1351 at 304-306 
and R. 1355 at 979). After three weeks at home with the baby, 
Victoria returned to work (R. 1351 at 305). Defendant was mostly 
unemployed during the three months from the child's birth until 
its disappearance on August 26, 1986 (R. 1351 at 308). The baby 
tending duties basically fell to defendant (R. 1351 at 337 and R. 
1355 at 1050). Because defendant was not steadily employed and 
because of the attendant financial pressures, the family moved 
back to Logan, Utah on August 15, 1986 (R. 1351 at 304). 
During the three months of the baby's life, Victoria 
became concerned and complained to defendant about the way he 
cared for the child (R. 1351 at 309, 319 and R. 1355 at 984). 
When the baby was a few days old, just out of the hospital, he 
did not sleep well at night. One morning, the child was crying 
and defendant took him out into the garage. Victoria could still 
hear the baby's crying and went out to see what was wrong. The 
baby had only a light blanket on and it was too cold outside for 
The volumes of the trial transcript have been given record 
numbers successive to the pleadings files. Those numbers, with 
the individual page numbers from the transcripts, will be used in 
citations to the trial transcripts. 
him. After that, when the baby tried to yawn, he would start to 
cry because his mouth would not open correctly (R. 1351 at 312-
13). 
When the child was about five weeks old, Victoria came 
home from work one day and found defendant dressing the baby 
after a bath. The baby's skin was yellow, saliva was coming from 
his mouth, he wasn't breathing well, and his skin was cold to the 
touch. Victoria asked defendant if he had given the baby a cold 
bath; defendant replied that he had just put the child under the 
tap. Victoria told defendant that she was going to take the 
child to the doctor but defendant told her that she worried too 
much. At defendant's suggestion, Victoria put the child in warm 
water and in blankets, and the child finally returned to normal 
(R. 1351 at 310-11). 
When the baby was approximately two months old, 
Victoria returned from work and found defendant with the child in 
his arms. The child was trying to cry but could not breathe. 
When asked what had happened, defendant said that the child had 
fallen out of his arms when defendant was trying to open a can 
(R. 1351 at 312). 
After the family moved to Logan, and about a week 
before the child disappeared, Victoria returned from work and 
found the baby in its carrier sitting on the living room floor. 
Defendant, who was sitting next to the baby, told Victoria that 
the baby had fallen off of the seat in the car. When Victoria 
tried to pick up the baby, he cried in pain (R. 1351 at 314). 
Victoria saw that the baby had a blue bruise on its kneecap (R. 
1351 at 320). Victoria told defendant that they should take him 
to the doctor to check him. Defendant said that he already had 
taken the baby to the doctor, who had taken eight or nine x-rays, 
and said that the baby was fine (R. 1351 at 314). The baby's 
doctor testified that he had no record that the child was ever 
brought in for x-rays (R. 1356 at 1207-1208; see also R. 1356 at 
1249). Defendant became angry when Victoria continued to cry and 
worry about the infant (R. 1351 at 314-15). 
A few days after the occurrence in the car, Victoria 
found a bruise on the baby's forehead. Defendant said that the 
door had hit the baby. Victoria became angry and again accused 
defendant of not taking good care of the child; defendant told 
her that she worried for nothing (R. 1351 at 321). 
Another time when the child was one-and-a-half to two 
months old, Victoria returned from work and found that the baby 
had a red mark on its lip (R. 1351 at 317-18). On another 
occasion, Victoria found red finger marks on the baby's ribs and 
red marks on the baby's neck. She told defendant that he had to 
be more careful when he picked up the baby. Defendant said that 
the marks on the neck were from the baby's shirt. Victoria told 
him that she did not want to see marks on the baby again; 
defendant said that he would be more careful (R. 1351 at 318-20). 
Every time Victoria expressed concern about the baby, 
defendant accused her of only caring for the child. Victoria 
accused him of being jealous of the baby (R. 1351 at 322-23). 
Defendant's unemployment and the attendant money problems caused 
dissension between Victoria and defendant. Defendant became 
angry when his motorcycle was repossessed because Victoria would 
not make the payments for it (R. 1351 at 332-34). Defendant also 
became angry when the baby was colicky and crying (R. 1351 at 334 
and R. 1352 at 353-55). Victoria and defendant obtained a 
heating pad for the baby to help with the colic. One night the 
baby began crying and defendant got up to check it. When 
Victoria awoke later, the baby was still crying; Victoria found 
that defendant had turned the heating pad on high and the baby 
was sweating (R. 1352 at 353-55). 
When Victoria returned to work after the baby was born, 
she worked Monday through Friday. Each morning, she would rise, 
get ready for work, then feed the baby and sit with him for 
awhile until her ride arrived at 5:20 a.m. (R. 1351 at 340-41). 
On August 26, 1986, defendant got up early as well (R. 1355 at 
989). While he had sometimes gotten up early with Victoria, this 
morning was different because defendant told her to stay with the 
baby and he would watch for her ride (R. 1351 at 341). When 
Victoria left for work, the baby was wearing a white undershirt 
and a disposable diaper (R. 1351 at 342). 
That afternoon, before 2:00 p.m., a police officer 
approached her at work and told her that her baby was missing (R. 
1351 at 306-307). The officer took her to the police station 
where she approached defendant and asked him where the baby was. 
Defendant answered, "I am sorry. I didn't do it on purpose." 
(R. 1352 at 363-64). Defendant told her that he had left the 
baby in their car when he went in to Osco Drug in Logan; when he 
returned in ten minutes, the baby was gone (R. 1352 at 364-66). 
Victoria provided the baby's birth certificate, with his 
footprints on it, a father's card with the baby's handprints, and 
photographs of the baby to the police to help find the child (R. 
1351 at 318 and R. 1352 at 358-59). Defendant told her not to 
give these things to the police and became angry with her when 
she handed them over to the authorities (R. 1352 at 361-62). 
On the evening of August 26, defendant gave the police 
a description of the baby. He told them that the baby was 
wearing a solid blue t-shirt, a disposable diaper, and was 
wrapped in a multicolored, striped, receiving blanket (R. 1353 at 
610). Defendant told police that he and the baby had gone back 
to sleep after Victoria left and the baby awoke again about 8:00 
or 8:30 a.m. At about 9:00 a.m., the baby was still awake and 
defendant put him on the couch in the living room while defendant 
fixed water damage in the shower (R. 1353 at 612). Defendant ran 
out of DAP, a putty used to repair showers, and decided to go to 
Valley Discount, a store in Logan (R. 1353 at 613 and 616). At 
this time, about 10:30 a.m., the baby was asleep, so defendant 
left the child and their dog at home while he went to the store 
(R. 1353 at 613-14). Defendant returned around noon and found 
the baby still asleep. Defendant cleaned himself up, changed 
clothes, and decided to run other errands (R. 1353 at 615-16). 
By this time, the baby had awakened and defendant fed 
and changed him (R. 1353 at 615). At 12:40-12:45 p.m., defendant 
started the family Cadillac to allow it to warm up. After five 
minutes, he picked up the baby, got the dog (a toy poodle named 
Rambo), and placed the baby in its carrier in the passenger side 
of the front seat (R. 1353 at 614 and 616-17). Defendant drove 
to the parking lot of Osco Drug but could find no shade there to 
park the car in. Defendant pulled to the west side of the store 
under some trees, rolled the windows down about six inches, and 
went into Osco Drug (R. 1353 at 617-18). Defendant said that he 
left the doors unlocked (R. 1353 at 618). 
Defendant found the DAP and purchased it. He came out 
of the store, walked to the car and opened the driver's door, at 
which time he noticed that the baby was gone. He ran to the pay 
phone at Osco Drug and telephoned the Logan City Police (R. 1353 
at 618). 
Officer Mike Vaughan of the Logan City Police was the 
first to respond to the scene, arriving at 12:57 p.m. (R. 1352 at 
472-74). At Officer Vaughan's questioning, defendant said that 
he had locked the doors of the car but that the windows were down 
for ventilation. At that point, defendant reached through the 
open window of the passenger door and unlocked that door. Inside 
was the small white poodle; a baby car seat on the front seat of 
the car, facing the driver's side; and a baby bottle (R. 1352 at 
475 and 481). After the door was unlocked, the officer opened 
it. The dog, who had been running around the car as defendant 
and Officer Vaughan approached, immediately jumped out of the car 
(R. 1352 at 475). The officer looked around the interior of the 
car for the child, then, not seeing it, stepped back from the car 
and closed the door (R. 1352 at 476). He asked defendant if 
anything else was missing, and defendant responded that there was 
nothing else (R. 1352 at 477). 
Detective Kevin Christensen arrived at 1:10 p.m. and 
began taking photographs and helping to process the vehicle for 
fingerprints (R. 1353 at 704-705). He was able to enter through 
the passenger door which had been unlocked earlier. He had to 
lean through the car from the passenger side and unlock the 
driver's door in order to enter that side of the car (R. 1353 at 
706). The driver's side window was opened one to two inches when 
the officers arrived (R. 1353 at 711-12). The officers were 
unable to identify any of the prints taken from the vehicle (R. 
1354 at 857). 
Investigation by law enforcement disclosed that 
defendant's purchase at Osco Drug was completed at 12:46 p.m. and 
the call to the police was received at 12:54 p.m. (R. 1352 at 539 
and 457). Patricia Parker was behind defendant in the checkstand 
at Osco Drug; she remembered that he paid for his purchase in 
quarters and "became agitated, became nervous, anxious" when he 
was a dime short (R. 1352 at 545-46). Mrs. Parker's husband, a 
uniformed peace officer, was with her at the time. Defendant 
never approached the officer when defendant sought to report his 
child missing (R. 1352 at 550-53). 
The police were able to find witnesses who had been in 
the area of Osco Drug during the relevant time frame (R. 1353 at 
570-605). One woman had parked at a curb near Osco Drug, under 
the trees, had entered the store, and made several purchases. No 
other cars were parked there when she arrived. When she left the 
store about forty minutes later, she noticed defendant's car 
parked in front of, and "very close," to hers (R. 1353 at 572-
76). She started her car and sat there for a few minutes to 
allow the air conditioner to cool the car. During that time, she 
did not see anyone around defendant's car (R. 1353 at 576-77). 
"It was so terribly hot that day that most people were smart 
enough to stay out of it." (R. 1353 at 577). Another woman 
recalled driving past that area at 12:52 p.m. on August 26 and 
noticing nothing unusual (R. 1353 at 581-82 and 586). A third 
woman was driving back to work after lunch and saw defendant's 
car at about 12:52 p.m. at Osco Drug. She also saw a man about 
defendant's height walking toward the store (R. 1353 at 588-93). 
Marthan Ferguson was driving near Osco Dr:ug at 12:30 to 
12:45 p.m. on August 26. She saw defendant's car parked at the 
curb near the store (R. 1353 at 594-95). She was stopped at a 
stop sign, waiting to cross 500 North, when she saw a girl with 
long blond hair approach defendant's car (R. 1353 at 596-97). 
The girl got out of a car parked across the street from 
defendant's car, walked across the street and tried to open the 
driver's door of defendant's Cadillac (R. 1353 at 597-99). The 
door apparently was locked (R. 1353 at 598). Mrs. Ferguson could 
see defendant's poodle running back and forth across the front 
seat; she assumed the girl was trying to let the dog out because 
of the heat that day (R. 1353 at 597-98 and 605). Mrs. Ferguson 
finally drove through the intersection, but then had to stop to 
avoid hitting the girl who was returning to her own car. The 
girl's car was running and Mrs. Ferguson waited until the girl 
drove away before proceeding on her way (R. 1353 at 600). Mrs. 
Ferguson did not get close enough to defendant's car to see if 
there was a baby inside; however, if there was a baby, the dog 
was running over it (R. 1353 at 601). 
Carol Comins lived upstairs from defendant and Victoria 
in Logan (R. 1352 at 443). She heard the baby crying between 
9:00 and 10:00 a.m. the morning of August 26 (R. 1352 at 444). 
She left for a doctor's appointment; when she returned at 11:00 
a.m., defendant's car was gone (R. 1352 at 445). Mrs. Comins did 
not hear the baby again after 11:00 a.m. (R. 1352 at 454). 
On October 7, 1986, George Blummer was duck hunting in 
an area west of Logan, called the Valley View marina (R. 1353 at 
716). He saw a bundle in the water near his canoe, approximately 
eight to ten feet from shore (R. 1353 at 716-17). He picked it 
up and saw that it was some kind of blanket material, wrapped in 
an electrical cord (R. 1353 at 717-18). Mr. Blummer opened one 
end of the bundle and a rock fell out; he looked inside the 
bundle, saw "some fleshy type of material," and put the bundle 
back in the water (R. 1353 at 718-19). Mr. Blummer thought that 
the bundle contained an unwanted litter of dogs or cats (R. 1353 
at 725-26). The bundle weighed approximately twenty-five pounds 
and was three feet by one-and-a-half to two feet, and was in 
water two-and-a-half feet deep (R. 1353 at 719-721). 
2 
On October 11, 1986, Arthur Flandro was at the Valley 
View marina on the Bear River, duck hunting (R. 1353 at 727-28). 
At about 11:45 a.m., he noticed a bundle about three feet from 
shore, in about a foot-and-a-half of water (R. 1353 at 728). Mr. 
2 
The transcript indicates that Arthur L. Flanders was called as 
a witness; however, the witness gave his name as Flandro. The 
State will use that spelling of his name. 
Flandro moved the material in the bundle and realized that the 
bundle contained human remains. He told another person there to 
secure the area from dogs or other people. Mr. Flandro then ran 
up to the highway, flagged down a motorist, and asked him to 
notify authorities in town (R. 1353 at 729-30). The police 
arrived in fifteen to twenty minutes (R. 1353 at 730). Officers 
with scuba training searched the river bottom and retrieved the 
bundle with the body in it, and other human bones which had 
escaped from the bundle (R. 1353 at 738-43). 
The bundle and bones were taken to the medical 
examiner's office (R. 1353 at 753-55). The bundle was made up of 
a padded cloth material, tied with an electrical cord, five 
stones, a receiving blanket, and a baby's body dressed in a blue 
t-shirt and a disposable diaper (R. 1353 at 752 and 756-58). The 
medical examiner found extensive decomposition and was unable to 
determine the cause of death (R. 1354 at 782-90). He was able to 
rule out beating, shooting, stabbing, and cutting as causes of 
death; he could not rule out death by suffocation, drowning, 
shaking, strangulation, or SIDS (sudden infant death syndrome) 
(R. 1354 at 789-90 and 796-97). The examiner did determine that 
the manner of death was homicide because of the way that the body 
was disposed of (R. 1354 at 788). Using the newborn footprints 
and father's day card handprint supplied by Victoria, the 
officials were able to identify the body as that of Steven Roy 
James (R. 1354 at 793 and 804-12). 
The cloth in which the body was wrapped was identified 
by Don Lawhan, the owner of the home in Preston in which 
defendant and Victoria had been living. Mr. Lawhan had been a 
maintenance worker in Preston, working on smoke and fire damaged 
buildings. As part of that work, he used mattress covers as drop 
clothes; he had given defendant permission to use the mattress 
covers when defendant and Victoria moved to Logan (R. 1354 at 
841-44). He identified the cloth in which the baby's body was 
wrapped as a cloth he had used to cover furniture while painting. 
He specifically remembered a hole in the cloth as one he had to 
be careful of when he used the cloth (R. 1354 at 844-45). 
Victoria also identified the mattress cover, or drop cloth, as 
one used by defendant in moving their belongings to Logan. After 
the move, the cloth was put with other things in a back room of 
defendant's Logan apartment (R. 1357 at 1293-94). 
Defendant was arrested and charged with murdering his 
child (R. at 1A and 18). While he was being held in the Cache 
County Jail he was housed, at one point, with several other 
inmates (R. 1356 at 1140). One inmate, Ronald Peterson, 
testified that he heard defendant speaking to another inmate, Jon 
Lippencott (R. 1355 at 922). Defendant told Lippencott that he 
had killed the baby; defendant had been out to the marina the day 
before the baby disappeared (R. 1355 at 923). Peterson told law 
enforcement about this conversation, hoping to get a better deal 
on his case. The State never made a deal with him (R. 1355 at 
929 and 931). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court has considerable latitude as to the 
manner in which it conducts voir dire. The court does not abuse 
i t s d i s c r e t i o n i f t h e manner i n wl l i ch i t c o n d u c t s v o i r d i r e 
c "(ir fin a d e q u a t e o p p o r t u n i t y fo r counse l t o g a i n t h e 
i n f o r m a t i o n n e c e s s a r y u uvuldul t. Jini'i.-i I H I M J J I . t 
d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t he was p r e j u d i c e d by t h e niannei in which ^nir 
ci i in i' i^ iiiiH i f Miiliinr t PI I llif t r i a l r n u r t ' n ^ni i d i rp a d e q u a t e l y 
r e v e a l e d t h o s e whu lidd lujutu. ,. c 
o r i n n o c e n c e based mi media t . /p ' c .L*- , • . ose p e r s o n s were excused 
i i 11 in i I III in i ' i « i in it ( ' III III H •» 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 in 111 a i- i . ' -^;" ' ' ut 
t h e p a n e l , most ol which t h e _ . i a o ^ .< . o^d^i f . .., t 
be Low i nl lias not mi a p p e a l , s p p r i f i e d am ••-: p a r t i c u l a r 
ques Limi,1 wh i« '» \ I " '«' ' ' ' -
s p e c i f i e d what o t h e r I n f o r m a t i o n t u r t h e r 4 i e H ^ u i i U ^ «d- . - d 
t o e l i c i t . 
The lnc iubiCJII I I I II I LJ 11» 11 1 11111 1 11 " 1 1 < 111 I t n 
a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e f o r p u r p o s e s of* 1 " n-1 d e g r e e murdm 
( I i-i HK if i i 'ri I i i HI i I in 11 in if i In MI | i Ipf e n d a n t due p r o c e s s , The 
s u b s e c t i o n i n v o l v e d i s mil n m l I nr v a g u e n e s s JMJL'UUIJI.1 ill 
s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e s t h a t f e l o n i e s i n v o l v i n g v i o l e n c e a r e 
in mi 11 III 1 1 1 11 1 II III III 11 1 i 1 1 i i 1 t 1 1 1 i f 1 L mi 11 1 III 1 1 1 1 mi 1 111 mi 1  i n ) 1 * ' i n II f 1 * 1 e n 1 i (-i"«• 1 f 1 I i f i i 
other jurisdictions, and it cannot be 1 ead Lu imply MJUIII aii 
exclusion. Neither does thp statute deny defendant equal 
I J ; U ^ 1 1 - ' " ' I .I'll" I '"* 1 I ' l l l . l i i I t i l t 1 " . 11 "i iif if»' n I I i' I1! 1 "' ' I i'i 1 TII 
that his California conviction would only have been H misdemi'iiii r 
if commit tori 1111 11 f- a h 
UHI i.iiiilijuiiimi «) HI 11 mi I H I mi mi j u a y j i i t i i m i u r n w in i i r r i i t d n « i : i liny 1  i n 
verdict should be treated as a motion, for arrest of judgment, the 
I 1 in mi in rill, prnrvdurp ana Ion I judgment n.o. v The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for arrest 
of judgment and motion for sentencing under the next lower 
category of offense. In order to grant either motion on the 
grounds advanced by defendant, the court would have had to 
determine that no reasonable person could have found defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant did not establish in 
the trial court, and does not establish before this Court, that 
the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial on the issue of 
intent or knowledge that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt. 
Defendant has not preserved for appeal the claim that 
he was denied access to his counsel during trial. The record is 
devoid of any indication that defendant brought this issue to the 
attention of the trial court until after the jury had retired for 
deliberations. Because defendant either failed to raise a timely 
objection or failed to make a timely record of his objection, 
this Court should not rule on this issue. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
rejecting defendant's proposed "reasonable alternative 
hypothesis" instructions. The trial court adequately instructed 
the jury as to the prosecution's burden of proof; consequently, 
it was not an abuse of discretion to reject the proposed 
instructions. 
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion when 
it denied defendant's two motions for new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence. The trial court found that the evidence 
could have been discovered before trial and was merely 
cumulative. The evidence was also m e r e 1 ^ impeachment evidence, 
although thp court did not assign that- -ae.- r : .s decisJ.Mii, 
F J f i d I i " | , l l i i ' 1 IL n i in i mi I  n u n 11 n I in in 11 | il I h in I I  I  in v \ i d e m c i 1 i ^ i m l i i in I 1 1 mm I t 
in <Hi different i.esult nun retrial • The record supports these 
conclusions ol the Liidl court, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONDUCTED VOIR DIRE 
FOR PURPOSES OF JURY SELECTION, 
Defendant 'i. Il M I . I i' I  m iiiri n ippeal Is that: he was denied 
his right to due process, right In counsel, aud right to a iair 
a n d i m p a r t i a 1 j u r y b y t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h t h e t r I a ] c o u i: t: 
had a constitutional right to attorney-conducted voir dire, voir 
dire of the venire individually, and more extensive questioning 
ol tin •,'" panel. 
The conduct of jury voi r dire is governed by rul e 
18(b^ uLaii Ruxes of Criminal Procedure (1 990), which reads: 
The court may permit counsel or tl le 
defendant to conduct the examination of the 
prospective jurors or may itself conduct the 
examination. In the latter event, the court-
may permit counsel or the defendant to 
supplement the examinati on. by siicl i further 
inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself 
submit to the prospective jurors additional 
questions requested by counsel oi: the 
defendant. 
Unlike SOHIP other jurisdictions cited by defendant,- this 
" I I J ! j fa I 1 1 I,' I 1 I i 11 I i I 1 1 I I 1 1 1  11 H ' M i l i J J j i " J i ' I 1 i i mi i I 1 1 II II 11 1' I i ,-i II if' i 11 )i l I 
for the conduct of examination J or jury service. While there may 
.be debate in the legal journals about the advisability of 
different methods of voir dire, the appellate courts of this 
state have not dictated any specific method to be used by the 
trial courts. 
The latitude afforded trial courts was reaffirmed by 
this Court in State v. Moton, 749 P.2d 639 (Utah 1988), when it 
said: 
The trial court has traditionally been given 
considerable latitude as to the manner and 
the form of conducting the voir dire 
examination and is only restricted in that 
discretion from committing prejudicial error. 
Id. at 643 (citing Utah State Road Commission v. Marriott, 21 
Utah 2d 238, 444 P.2d 57 (1968)). That discretion extends to 
"seating fair, impartial jurors" in the context of defendant's 
constitutional right to a fair trial by impartial jurors. State 
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988). In Bishop, this Court 
defined the purpose of voir dire: 
Voir dire provides the means for detecting 
juror prejudice or bias, thereby enabling 
counsel to intelligently challenge such 
persons. Accordingly, sufficient latitude in 
the questioning process must be given to 
preserve the right to a fair trial. It 
follows that whether the trial court abused 
its discretion in conducting voir dire turns 
on whether, considering the totality of the 
questioning, counsel was afforded an adequate 
opportunity to gain the information necessary 
to evaluate jurors. 
On appeal, an appellant has the burden of 
establishing that reversible error resulted 
from an abuse of discretion. 
Id, at 448 (footnotes omitted). This Court has also determined 
that questions asked by the trial court which are similar to 
those requested by a defendant suffice to refute a defendant's 
claim of prejudice. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1252 (Utah 
1988). 
The f a c t t h a t p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s ma) \\a\aj U-M.-'I HX|HI,-JMI 
t o media c o v e r a g e of a c a s e , " s t a n d i n g a l o n e , does n o t 
p r e s u P I 111 i v *'" I y < J fi \»• < '"«' < « "' * JI f c •» r > *"' r * 1i1 • '»f d n f% p r o o e s s (" i , e , •  \ f n i r 
and i m p a r t i a l j u r y || S t a t e v. G a r d n e r , '" II' Ill"1, iM l!" " I "/'" (III , In 
1 9 8 9 ) , c e r t , d e n i e d , III) S . C t , 1 8 3 7 ( 1 9 9 0 ) , B a s e d o n e x a m i n a t i o n 
c r r ' p n r r n fi IK"! '"nirnc I iiiiii 711 ) | ' n i * • ? •: 1" I l a n s c r i p t o i t h e 
v o i r d i r e , ' ' t h i s Cour t in Gardnei d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e news 
j^»)or*-- •• nn\ " i n f e c t e d " t h e pai ir l w i th p r e j u d i c e or b i a s 
c . Jini ii I1! \ ill I in i I I n MI , l III mi i.i < i ,i mi I r l H t c ? r m i t i e d I" a 
preconceived ^ * : ; . ; . . * + nocei •- . ijtomaticaliy 
preclude a fa This * * <?*<-*. 
To noia mar tne mere exibL«uue ui 
preconceived notion as to the guilt or 
innocence of an accused,- without more, i s 
sufficient to rebut the presumption of a 
prospective juror's impartiality would be to 
establish an impossible standard. It is 
sufficient if the juror can lay aside his 
impression or opinion and render a verdict 
based on the evidence presented i n court. 
I d .»' / n ! i fi i iiiiiHj l i v i n i D u w d , II >» " I ' , ' I 
Defendant is also required to have specifically 
preserved below the issues which he now raises on appeal, Oi i 
t l i a t: iin i,i in i
 (|l i ii in i . i , u m nr in I I . ii.ii 1 1 1 ; 
First, as we have repeatedly stated, "A 
general rule of appellate review in criminal 
cases in Utah is that a contemporaneous 
objection or some form of specific 
preservation of claims of error must be made 
a part of the trial court record before an 
appellate court wi 11 review such clai m on 
appeal." Importantly, the grounds for the 
objection must be distinctly and specifically 
stated. Here, although defendant made ' 
general motion . . ., the grounds he now 
raises on appeal were not specifically or 
distinctly stated to the court below. Thus, 
under the standard noted, they were not 
preserved for our review. 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State 
v, Tillman, 750 P. 2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)) (emphasis in original) 
(footnote omitted). The Utah Court of Appeals applied this 
premise to the subject of voir dire in Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 
198 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), in which it stated the general 
proposition: 
A timely and recorded objection to the 
trial court's failure to comply with a 
request at trial puts the judge on notice of 
the asserted error and allows the opportunity 
for correction at that time in the course of 
the proceeding. A specific objection to the 
failure to make a requested voir dire inquiry 
is required so that the trial court may 
correct its error before the jury is selected 
and empaneled. There is no support for 
appellant's claim that the trial judge knew 
the action he was requested to take but 
refused to take it. 
Id. at 201. See also State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844 (Utah 
1988) (record did not demonstrate that defendant was prevented 
from asking proper questions; it is defendant's obligation to 
provide a record which supports his contentions). 
The record in the present case does not demonstrate 
that defendant was prejudiced by the manner in which voir dire 
was conducted. Less than a month prior to trial, defendant filed 
a motion for "individual, sequest[er]ed voir dire examination." 
(R. at 1086-88). That motion was based on defendant's concerns 
about pretrial publicity, questions and answers about which might 
taint the remaining panel, and the fact that the charge was 
capital murder. Defendant felt that prospective jurors would be 
more candid and truthful if questioned individually. Defendant 
also asked that a juror questionnaire be disseminated in order to 
"screen" the jurors. Finally,, defendant r^qu^Fted tJIMt vcu i dire 
be conducted hy f he attorneys. In response, I tie State argued 
t l l d l Ml I I i i l l l l l I I III II I II I I l l l l l l l l il||l: I IKM ( i II I V I i n H I I I I II II ill I III11!1 | HI I J F , p P ( t | V I » 
juror had knowledge of the case?, and, aft.ei identifying any WJHI 
answered alf irmatively i inquire private «i.jut the knowledge and 
JL I d U.ui ing on the case | r , u I Mil I • L"b ; 
At the pretrial hearing conducted Aj.il *? -^n 
lllllli i l l I  mi ill f n i n i P i II i I iiiiiiii i I I  111 in I I've w o n a U U L s u b m * , * 
jury questionnaire tu Lhe piuspcc live urors, nr 
the death penalty had been waived (Transcript : pretrial 
r 1111 h • i H11 i 1 h*-• t k • el t I i'i I" I | i in 1 II I ' ' me State, 
t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r o v i d e d to LOUIIS---;I L*V p i ^ pooc u w i ^ f ^ e " 
q u e s t ionna.i r e , arid i n v i t e d counsel , t o su ; \ ernent * ^ - r c i ^ s e d 
q u e s t i o n s WLUIII «I
 t nil I in i MI mm i d< i ed app 1  H • 
at 929-31) Both p a r t i e s s u b m i t t e d p r o p o s e d q u e s t i o n b 
Hi i "' ' ' Mini HHi'I Ml I • 
At Lhe p i e t r i a i c o n f e r e n c e , d i d a i d u n t d igued llnil l In 
pane l s h o u l d be q u e s t i o n e d e i t h e r i n d i v i d u a l l y or in y i o u p s of 
I mi i i i i i i i mi i i n i i li I n I n i l 11 11 i 1 i i I'm in 11 l i i i i i i i l ' ii mi i i i JI fin l e d L l i x o 
case | P"l , di » • li | Defendant dls-o a J J t-'j1 " I, without citing any 
authority, that questioning a 1 ai ge pane J wuuid cause iiidividua] 
\n- H I i t i n t i u II 11 Iiii II II i l l i II 11III"i"i 11 i II I i i i IIIIIIIII 1 | u t \ c . t i i i i i i i i 1 M o n o * 1 1 y 
(PT. ill 6 - / ) fttter a r g u m e n t , t h e coui t d e n i e d Lhe mot ion t o r 
i n d i v i d u a l , s e q u e s t e r e d v o i r d i r e , s t a t i ini, | i )hexe w i l l me 
a m p l e j 1 1 1 a J 111 i 11 111 I 111 1111 | »• *— I t*i , I 11 MI I J > i»11 t .i s • • • . 
[C]ounse l w i l l be g i v e n e v e r y oppor tun i ty d u r i n g that , p r o c e s s t o 
111 » i a 11 o n - g o i ng ba s x s"" i I IIII'". a I SI). 
At the beginning of trial, the court called sixty 
prospective jurors and began questioning them (R. 1350 at 4). 
The jurors were questioned, inter alia, about their 
acquaintanceship with counsel, defendant, witnesses, and anyone 
in law enforcement; their prior jury experience; their experience 
with crime, as victim or accused; and their media exposure to the 
present case (R. 1350 at 6-10). Of the sixty-nine (either 
prospective jurors or alternates) who were eventually called and 
questioned, twenty-five were excused for cause for reasons other 
than having formed an opinion of defendant's guilt based on the 
publicity (R. 1350 at 36, 64, 82, 84, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106, 
107, 108, 110, 112, 136, 151, 154, 156, 158, and R. 1351 at 216, 
221, 233, 240, 242, 248, and 253). Of those not excused for a 
cause other than an opinion of defendant's guilt, nine had either 
not heard of or had no memory of publicity about the case (R. 
1350 at 43, 77, 80, 123-24, 141, 166, and 192, and R. 1351 at 
227, and 250-51). Seven others were excused for cause when they 
indicated to the court that they had formed opinions as to 
defendant's guilt or innocence on the basis of the publicity the 
case had generated. Each time a venireman indicated that he or 
she may have formed an opinion about guilt, the court immediately 
called the person to the bench and further questioning was 
conducted outside the hearing of the rest of the panel (R. 1350 
at 17-18, 24, 46, 114, 116, 145, and R. 1351 at 224). Those who 
were left for counsel to exercise their peremptory challenges had 
either received no publicity about the case, or had formed no 
opinion about guilt based on the publicity. 
After fifty-seven people had been questioned, an off-
t he-recnrd discus^) on between the •• • : anil ruunsHl wan JIUUJ. At 
the L uJ ic 1 us 11 .11 I 111 11 i ' 11" ' "" i \11 I i *' I ""11 «'i til111 ! i n t n n 1 
g e n e r a l q u e s t i o n s < ' i *'»M a t 1 6 7 - 6 8 ) , The cour t then . s ing led 
i ,' p - o s p e c t i ve j u r o r s f o r t u r t h e r q u e s t i o n i n g i n chambers 
(R I'" 11 I ( II ',' ) . 
At the conclusion of that questioning, 1 \* State passed 
I in . i " " ' i defense counsel then 
stated that they felt Lhey did u m W v e adequate iiiiurrricitj ii I i i mi 
which id make an informed decision about challenges. 
I ' l l >f;M i in in i a i i y i m i h « in f n i l f in in I I I i in I i H I ( i n 1 i (| mi in I "" 1 h e 
publicity issue with veniremen who nau jiiaicateu dii expusuie to 
publicity about tho rasp lint wrm had indicated that they had 
formed no o p i n i u n i inin i > I IHI-IIIIM| hi ill li i iiii i in ill I I i I P vm I I 
" h o n e s t s t a t e m e n t f s ] " ( R , 13 50 at ] 7 J ) I he com L d e n i e d 
i iniMi i "< i iliid 1 (nn«c»1- I i III I inn bu t a s k e d counse l 1 11 p r o p o s e f u r t h e r 
s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n s which c o u n s e l wanted in Ii i i i I i 
I 4) Counsel p roposed s e v e r a l , most of which t h e c urn a g r e e a 
il i i I I I I ' ill Il I I I I |i I'lii i i i I l r e f u s e d t n af wne the r 
p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r b w i t h l d imly members oi t i j e n d b in =«w 
e n f o r c e m e n t would fee l t h a t they would need t o e x p l a i n t h e i r 
uo:n;I i I I i I I I I in mi I ii II I I I , iitemboi' « in h loncl'i | I 1 150 a t 175 ) , The 
cour t ill HI d e c l i n e d t o a sk If j u i o r s would too l an o b l i g a t i o n t o 
e x p l a i n t h e i r d e l i b e r a t i o n s of t i i e i r v e r d i c t i n t h e e v e n t o 
acqu i I I I I i I I I m i I I ! l l i 
AttfT the additional questions were asked genera lly, 
""Of" prospective |uror was questioned further at the bench, and 
excused (R. 1350 at 188). Another bench conference with counsel 
was held and further questions asked of the panel (R. 1350 at 
188-90). In chambers, defense counsel challenged for cause all 
veniremen whom had indicated an exposure to publicity on the 
"basis of the publicity." Some other veniremen were challenged 
on other grounds (R. 1350 at 196-202). Defendant continued to 
object to exercising his peremptory challenges; however, he never 
proposed any further specific questions to be asked of the panel. 
Before exercising his challenges on the second day of trial, 
defendant filed an objection to the voir dire, generally stating 
that he had been prejudiced by a "superficial" questioning of the 
panel (R. at 938-43). He asked that the court reopen voir dire 
and permit attorney questioning of the panel, sequestered 
questioning, and the posing of questions which had been 
previously submitted by counsel (R. at 943). He did not specify 
which additional questions he wanted asked of the panel. The 
court denied this request (R. 1351 at 215). 
On appeal, defendant again objects to what he terms the 
limiting of voir dire. He does not indicate what specific 
questions the court should have asked. Neither does he 
specifically indicate how additional questions would have helped 
him in challenging prospective jurors. The trial court asked 
each panel member whether he or she had seen the publicity 
surrounding the case, and, if so, whether he or she had formed an 
opinion about the case based on that publicity. Defendant 
appears to assume that those who answered in the negative may not 
have been truthful, and that further unspecified questioning 
won,Id have ferreted out the falsity. He does not indicate how 
questi II I-I'U i" I r l i jwi j,if'i[,/(^i •Iwy reivl • , ' " ' 
television station they I u ten t.o or wali.h wuuJd havt uncoveied 
the deception "I hose who IMII Imnil of 1 he raue but t oririulated no 
o p i n J o r i i l l 1 1 1 i 1 1 . 1 1 1 J « 1 1 1 1 i ! 11 mi II I I in mi in 1 1 1 1 II i i 11 i mi i • 1 1 I 11 1 1 1 I i I in i i I in • -? Y 
u n d e r s t o o d and a c c e p t e d t h e c o n c e p t s oi p r e s u m p t i o n ol i n n o c e n c e 
ci I I In " i f i fp 1 ihui'den of proof , oould p r o p e r l y s i t mi t h e |in< •, 
Those pe i so i ib a g r e e d l.n l i s t e n i an c l ml 1 \ In il In p oiJmn k din I I 
a p p l y t h e law and d e c i d e t h e c a s e f a i r l y and i m p a r t i a l l y . The* 
quostiuiiLi askir- Il I  | I \u " i n I h i I T l y i ' e v eaLeci t h o s e who had 
a l r e a d y formed an o p i n i o n ; t.ho m u r I excused 1:1 lose p e r s o n s from, 
t h e v e n i r e , De fendan t was n o t d e n i e d h i s i::I gl i t t o s e l e c t a f a i r 
am: I :::::i I i i i | t a i : L i ci I "iiii i i 
POINT I I 
U T A H C 0 D E mM^ § 76.5.202(1)(h) WAS CORRECTLY 
APPLIED AT DEFENDANT#S TRIAL. THAT 
SUBSECTION IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS, NEITHER 
WAS ITS APPLICATION IN THIS CASE A VIOLATION 
OF DEFENDANT' FTTH"" TO EQUAL PROTECTION. 
Defi-^a - • beuuru oi «xi i «" that Utah Code 
P"1* c . WAC5 HT
 j _ t T y g n p ij Lin h i i L i ilbil i 1 . 
alternatively that t rifl -:bse. : i -n :s • i for vagueness ar 
otection. 
'-> . nallenged subse* ^ *
 A. . . t 
Criminal homicide consti tutes murder in the 
first degree if the actor intentionally or 
knowingly causes the death of another under 
any of the following circumstances: 
(h) The actor was previously convicted of 
first or second degree murder or of a 
felony involving the use or threat of 
violence to a person. For the purpose of 
this paragraph an offense committed in 
another jurisdiction, which if committed in 
Utah would be punishable as first or second 
degree murder, is deemed first or second 
degree murder. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(h) (1990). Defendant argues, 
without citing any legal authority, that the second sentence of 
subsection (h) limits the use of felonies involving the use or 
threat of violence to a person to Utah convictions. This 
construction belies the clear language of the statute. 
A standard rule of statutory construction is "that a 
statute, clear and unambiguous on its face, need not and cannot 
be interpreted by a court." Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 
§45.02 (4th ed. 1987). This Court has adopted that rule in State 
v. Johnson, 12 Utah 2d 220, 364 P.2d 1019 (1961), wherein it 
said: 
We . . . conclude that the legislation 
must be read in the light of its clear 
language and import[.] 
Id. When this rule is applied to the present case, defendant's 
argument is without merit. 
Subsection (h) contains two sentences. The first 
plainly states that it is an aggravating circumstance for first 
degree murder if the "actor was previously convicted of first or 
second degree murder or of a felony involving the use or threat 
of violence to a person." No qualification is stated as to the 
jurisdiction in which the murder or violent felony occurred. 
According to the first sentence, any first or second degree 
murder or violent felony serves as an aggravating circumstance. 
The second sentence of subsection " I does nut aiteet 
the use nf ,i conviction for violent felony as an aggravating 
C J i i i n n I (.1111. v . Il III 11 s e n t f i n i i in* i i ' I v i I «;,i i i f 1 " , L I li H ' 
s e cond d e g r e e murder c o n v i c t i o n s i o i a g g r a v a t j R t . ^ m t . n u 
t h a t d i f f e r e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n s c l a s s i f y murder w i t h d i f f e r e n t 
l a n g u a g e , t h e l e g x s l a t m c o i p l a i KM MJ I In ill i IIIIIMIM M IIIII i 
a n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n , which would be d e i i n e d a t a f i r s t or second 
deqre i iiiinri din in III ill, in bo u rei1 t o a q q r a v a t e t h e c h a r g e in 
U t a h , Thai b e n t e n c e ill in it- l i m i t th* ms» oil iiiUml llh • 11 IIIII y 
c o n v i c t i o n s a s a g g r a v a t i o n t o f e l o n i e s commit ted in Utah . The 
I anguaijp t\\ I IIH s l r i l u l n i in IIHIPR a i l v i o l e n t f e l o n y 
c o n v i c t i o n s a s a g g r a v a t i n g c i i e u r o s l a n c a s . 
Defendan t n e x t c La LITIS t h a t t h i s KLalnite i s v o i d f o r 
vaguei l e s s "  I li lllifu j s I a I i wi i-ririrUn ri t * i iiiii 1 MKIMWI'II w i I In stironq 
presumption of validity and wilL not be declared unconstitutional 
unless there ip no reasonable basis upon which they can he 
construed as cuniorru i nu h onsl ilul luniill IH-UJII J leineni! ' ,' _ _._ 
Criminal Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct,, 7b4 P,2d 6 33, 640 r > tah 
I'QRp) . 
This Court addressed
 (j agueness LJIJ-JIIlenye i i: - i ta i uLe 
in State v. Pilche r , 636 P.2d 4/(1 (Utah 19H1I) in which it said: 
A statute JLB not unconstitutionally vague 
if it is sufficiently explicit to inform the 
ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited. 
. . . The statute need only be as definite 
and certain as the subject matter permits. 
raised by the petitioners In Bouie v. City of Columbia/ 
347 (1964), in which the standard was set out as: 
"The constitutional requirement of 
definiteness is violated by a criminal 
statute that fails to give a person of 
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his 
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the 
statute. The underlying principle is that no 
man shall be held criminally responsible for 
conduct which he could not reasonably 
understand to be proscribed." 
378 U.S. at 351 (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612f 
617 (1954)). The statute now challenged gave defendant fair 
notice that a conviction of a felony involving the use or threat 
of violence to a person can be used as an aggravating 
circumstance for purposes of convicting him of murder in the 
first degree. The statute is not, as defendant alleges, 
ambiguous as to the use of foreign felonies. The statute 
specifically states that felonies involving the use or threat of 
violence to a person will be used for aggravating purposes. The 
language which clarifies the use of convictions of first or 
second degree murder does not refer to convictions of other 
violent felonies. Since the second sentence of subsection (h) 
does not refer to other violent felonies, it does not restrict 
the use of convictions for those other felonies. Consequently, 
all other violent felonies, whether Utah or foreign, may be used 
as aggravating circumstances. 
Finally, defendant alleges that use of defendant's 
California felony conviction violates his right to equal 
protection of the law. Defendant fails to cite any legal 
authority to support this contention; consequently, this Court 
should decline to address the issue. See State v. Amicone, 689 
P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant fails to support this 
argument by any legal analysis or authority, we decline to rule 
on it"). 
Defendant argues that his conviction in California 
would have been no more than a misdemeanor conviction for 
unlawful detention in Utah; consequently, he argues, its use as 
the aggravating circumstance of a violent felony conviction is a 
violation of equal protection. Defendant has never established, 
either in the trial court or before this Court, that defendant's 
crime would only have been a misdemeanor in Utah. The amended 
information to which defendant pled guilty charged him with false 
imprisonment, a felony. He was specifically charged with having 
"wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate[d] the personal 
liberty of Sharon Elizabeth Cates, effected by violence, menace 
and force" (R. at 1141). Defendant's sentence was suspended and 
he was placed on probation for three years (R. at 1142-46). Both 
because the crime was termed a violent felony, and because of the 
length of the probationary period, this crime was considered a 
violent felony in California. Given the definition of the crime 
and the severity of the sentence, it would also be considered a 
violent crime in Utah. Defendant simply has not demonstrated how 
the use of this California conviction violated his right to equal 
protection of the law. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, AND HIS MOTION 
FOR SENTENCING UNDER THE NEXT LOWER CATEGORY. 
Defendant next claims that the trial court erred when 
it denied his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and 
motion for sentencing under the next lower category. Both 
motions were based on defendant's claim that "there was no 
substantial evidence of a killing or of an intentional or knowing 
killing by defendant" (Brief of Appellant [hereafter Br. of App.] 
at 26). 
The denial of both motions are matters of discretion 
with the trial court. Citing decisions of this Court, the Utah 
Court of Appeals recently stated: 
The general rule concerning abuse of 
discretion is that the appellate court "will 
presume that the discretion of the trial 
court was properly exercised unless the 
record clearly shows the contrary." Goddard 
v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984); 
. . . An appellant has the burden of 
establishing that reversible error resulted 
from an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988). 
State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
As will be addressed below, a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is a civil remedy; the analog in 
criminal procedure is a motion to arrest judgment. Although this 
Court apparently has not set forth a specific abuse of discretion 
standard for a motion to arrest judgment, it has analogized a 
motion to arrest judgment to a motion for new trial. This Court 
has consistently declared that "the decision to grant or deny a 
new trial is a matter of discretion with the trial court and will 
not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion." State 
v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985); see also State v. 
Beach, 661 P.2d 961 (Utah 1983). Especially in a case such as 
this where the basis for the arrest of judgment is a claim of 
insufficient evidence, the trial court, as well as this Court, 
should accord the jury verdict the deference reserved for 
sufficiency claims. See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 
1985); State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980). As 
this Court said in State v. Myers, 606 P.2d 250 (Utah 1980): 
When there has been a trial by jury, the 
state, as well as the defendant, is entitled 
to the benefit of the findings and the 
verdict of the jury. The trial judge can 
intrude upon the prerogatives of the jury and 
substitute his judgment therefor only if he 
can so rule as a matter of law. 
Id. at 251. In a concurring opinion in Myers, Justice Wilkins 
added: 
An appellate court, or a trial court, is 
not permitted in a civil or criminal action 
to substitute its judgment for the jury's 
unless the verdict is based on evidence that 
is so inherently improbable that no 
reasonable mind could believe it (and in a 
criminal case a "not guilty" verdict cannot 
be overturned whether a reasonable mind could 
believe it or not). 
In short, the legal mechanism of arresting 
a judgment is a firmly entrenched exception 
to the rule of law . . . that jurors are the 
exclusive judges of the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight of the evidence. 
Id. at 253 (footnote omitted). 
As to defendant's motion for sentencing under the next 
lower category, the applicable statute provides that a court 
"may" enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category 
in certain circumstances. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1990). As 
this Court said in State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989): 
An appellate court will set aside a sentence 
imposed by the trial court if the sentence 
represents an abuse of discretion, State v. 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978), if 
the trial judge fails to consider all legally 
relevant factors, State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 
1019 (Utah 1989), or if the sentence imposed 
exceeds the limits prescribed by law. 
Id, at 1135. Defendant does not allege that the sentence imposed 
exceeded the limits prescribed by law or that the judge failed to 
consider all legally relevant factors. Consequently, this issue 
should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
A. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict. 
At the conclusion of the trial, after the jury had 
convicted him, defendant filed a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (R. at 1048-49). This motion did not 
cite a procedural rule supporting it; however, a motion for 
directed verdict and for judgment not withstanding the verdict is 
authorized by rule 50, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1990). 
However, the rules of civil procedure have applicability in 
criminal proceedings only "where there is no other applicable 
statute or rule[.]M Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e). The relief sought by 
defendant in this motion is governed by rule 23, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which reads: 
At any time prior to the imposition of 
sentence, the court upon its own initiative 
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, 
arrest judgment if the facts proved or 
admitted do not constitute a public offense, 
. . . or there is other good cause for the 
arrest of judgment. 
Defendant's motion should be treated and analyzed under rule 23. 
Defendant's motion was based, inter alia, upon a claim 
that the evidence did "not support a reasonable conclusion that 
the Defendant either intentionally or knowingly caused the death 
3 
of his infant child" (R. at 1048). On appeal, defendant claims 
3 
Defendant raised other bases in that motion but has not argued 
them on appeal. Those bases should be considered abandoned. 
that his motion should have been granted because there was 
insufficient evidence that the child was killed or that defendant 
intentionally or knowingly killed the child. Whether the child 
was killed was never raised below and should not be addressed for 
the first time on appeal. See State v. Johnson/ 774 P.2d 1141, 
1144 (Utah 1989); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 
1987). 
The motion to arrest judgment is based entirely on a 
claim of insufficient evidence. As noted above, in determining 
whether to intrude upon the jury's verdict, the trial court can 
do so "only if he can so rule as a matter of law." Myers, 606 
P.2d 250-251 (Utah 1980). This Court should then review the 
trial court's decision about the motion in the same light that it 
reviews any jury verdict. See State v. Myers, 606 P.2d 250, 253 
(Wilkins, J., concurring). If the jury verdict withstands this 
Court's scrutiny under the usual standard of review, the trial 
court's decision not to arrest judgment on that verdict is not an 
abuse of discretion. 
Appellate courts accord great deference to a jury 
verdict. It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the 
evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses. The 
"Court should only interfere when . . . reasonable men could not 
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." 
State v. Lammf 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980). Furthermore, 
defendant has the burden of establishing "that the evidence was 
so inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime." State v, Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980). See 
also State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989). 
Intent must often be inferred from surrounding 
circumstances. State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Utah 1983). 
The jury could and did properly infer defendant's intent to kill 
the child from the evidence presented to it. 
Although the medical examiner could not determine a 
specific cause of death due to the decomposition of the body, he 
did determine that the manner of death was homicide (R. 1354 at 
788-90). This opinion was based upon the manner in which the 
body was disposed of. The examiner said: 
Finding a body, bound and weighted with 
rocks, in a river, does not indicate to me 
that this was a natural death; [it indicated] 
that this was a body somebody wanted never 
found. 
(R. 1354 at 788). In addition to this, there was the evidence of 
defendant's jealousy of the child, and evidence that defendant 
had abused the child. Victoria DeLeon testified at length that 
defendant had taken the newborn into a cold garage and later had 
given the child a bath in cold water (R. 1351 at 312-13 and 310-
11). Another time, defendant left the baby with a heating pad 
turned up too high (R. 1352 at 355). Still another time, when 
defendant told Victoria that the baby had fallen from the car 
seat, he became angry when she was upset and crying (R. 1351 at 
314). Defendant told Victoria that she worried too much about 
the baby; that she cared more for the baby than she did about 
defendant (R. 1351 at 315-16). When defendant was tending the 
child, it developed red marks on its lip, ribcage and neck which 
were indicative of being struck or squeezed (R. 1351 at 317-19). 
The baby had a bruise on its knee and, at another time, a bruise 
between its eyes (R. 1351 at 320-21). Again, defendant expressed 
jealousy when Victoria cared for the child before responding to 
defendant (R. 1351 at 321-22). Several times the baby cried 
excessively and defendant became angry at that (R. 1351 at 334 
and R. 1352 at 353-54). The jury also heard evidence that 
defendant was unemployed and that money was tight for the family 
(R. 1351 at 332-34 and R. 1352 at 389). Defendant admitted that 
he became frustrated at the financial situation they found 
themselves in after the baby's birth (R. 1355 at 1042-48). 
The jury also had evidence of the elaborate ruse 
defendant set up and carried on for three months about the child 
having been kidnapped. Defendant's credibility became even more 
suspect when he testified that someone had broken into his 
apartment the day of the child's disappearance. Defendant 
implied that whoever broke into the apartment may have taken the 
drop cloth which was later found with the child's body wrapped in 
it (R. 1356 at 1097). On cross-examination, defendant admitted 
that he had known for some time that it was the police who had 
entered his apartment through a window the day of the 
disappearance (R. 1356 at 1101). There was also evidence that 
defendant was cold and calculating in his displays of emotion 
between the time the child disappeared and its body was found (R. 
1357 at 1307-1309). Finally, there was the testimony of Ronald 
Peterson that he had shared a cell with defendant and others and 
had overheard defendant tell another that defendant had killed 
the child. Defendant told the other inmate that defendant had 
been to the area where the body was found the day before the 
child disappeared (R. 1355 at 923). 
From all of this evidence, the jury could reasonably 
draw the inference that defendant intentionally or knowingly 
killed his child. The evidence is not so inconclusive or 
insubstantial that reasonable minds could not have found 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Lamm/ 
606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980); State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 
1168 (Utah 1980); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989). 
Defendant asks this Court to reduce his conviction to 
either negligent homicide, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (1990), or 
manslaughter, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990) (Br. of App. at 
33). Defendant fails to inform this Court how the evidence 
supports a finding that the homicide occurred due to criminal 
negligence, recklessness, or extreme emotional disturbance. 
Because defendant fails to provide legal or factual analysis, 
this Court should decline to address this issue. State v. 
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984). In any event, the evidence, 
as noted earlier in this point, supports the jury's determination 
that defendant acted with intent or knowledge when he killed his 
child. Consequently, this Court should not reduce the degree of 
defendant's conviction. 
B. Motion for Sentence Under Next Lower Category. 
Defendant's sentence was within the limits prescribed 
by law. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-202(2) and 76-3-206 (1990). It 
was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the 
motion for sentencing under the next lower category on the 
claimed basis that intent or knowledge had not been proven. 
Sufficiency of evidence is not a basis for entering a conviction 
of a lower category of offense. The provision under which the 
court could enter such a conviction reads: 
If the court, having regard to the nature 
and circumstances of the offense of which the 
defendant was found guilty and to the history 
and character of the defendant, concludes 
that it would be unduly harsh to record the 
conviction as being for that category of 
offense established by statute and to 
sentence the defendant to an alternative 
normally applicable to that offense, the 
court may . . . enter a judgment of 
conviction for the next lower category of 
offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (1990). Nothing in this statute 
provides that the court can reduce the conviction if the court 
feels that an element of the crime has not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This provision applies to the circumstances of 
the offense and history of defendant, not to the sufficiency of 
the evidence to convict. 
Even if this provision were applicable to sufficiency 
arguments, the trial court correctly denied the motion. As 
argued in subpoint A, the jury found that defendant had the 
requisite mental state to convict him of first degree murder. 
There was nothing so inconclusive or insubstantial about the 
evidence to cause the trial court to doubt the jury's finding and 
to sentence defendant to a lesser category. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE HIS CLAIM OF ERROR 
REGARDING ACCESS TO COUNSEL DURING TRIAL. 
Defendant complains that he was denied access to his 
counsel during the time he was housed in the Salt Lake County 
Jail during trial. Again, in order to preserve this issue for 
appellate review, defendant must have raised it in the trial 
court. This Court has said; 
First, as we have repeatedly stated, "A 
general rule of appellate review in criminal 
cases in Utah is that a contemporaneous 
objection or some form of specific 
preservation of claims of error must be made 
a part of the trial court record before an 
appellate court will review such claim on 
appeal." Importantly, the grounds for the 
objection must be distinctly and specifically 
stated. 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State 
v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)) (emphasis in original) 
(footnote omitted). It is also defendant's obligation to provide 
an adequate record for this Court to review the alleged errors. 
In State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1988), this Court stated: 
When a defendant predicates error to this 
Court, he has the duty and responsibility 
of supporting such allegation by an 
adequate record. Absent that record, 
defendant's assignment of error stands as 
a unilateral allegation which the review 
court has no power to determine. This 
Court simply cannot rule on a question 
which depends for its existence upon 
alleged facts unsupported by the record. 
Inasmuch as defendant has failed to provide 
an adequate record on appeal on this point, 
this Court presumes regularity in the 
proceedings below. State v. Robbins, 709 
P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985). 
Id. at 1388 (quoting State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 
(Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983)). 
In support of his claim that he was denied access to 
his attorneys, defendant provides only one record citation. A 
review of the record demonstrates that defendant either did not 
inform the trial court during the pendency of the trial that he 
was not being allowed access to his attorneys, or did not make a 
record about the problem during the time that he was being denied 
access. Because defendant had received a change of venue, his 
trial was conducted in Salt Lake County; he was housed in the 
Salt Lake County Jail during trial (PT. at 2-3). 
The trial commenced on May 1, 1989 with selection of 
the jury. Nothing in the first volume of the trial transcript 
indicates that defendant or his counsel addressed the court about 
a problem with communication or access to defendant at the Salt 
Lake County Jail (R. 1350). The transcript of the second day of 
trial does not record any communication from defendant or his 
counsel about a problem with communication or access (R. 1351). 
The only time the record mentions a "lack of access" is at the 
conclusion of the trial, after the jury had retired to 
deliberate. At that time, defense counsel objected to certain 
jury instructions issues, then said: 
Also want [sic] to note for the record the 
defendant's objection to the lack of access 
to counsel during phases of the trial in Salt 
Lake County, his inability of counsel to meet 
with him in Salt Lake County because of 
restrictions and procedures imposed by the 
county jail. Therefore, he is denied 
effective assistance of counsel as a result 
of the denial. 
(R. 1357 at 1374)• If defendant ever raised the issue to the 
trial court before the jury retired to deliberate, he failed to 
raise it on the record• 
Defendant either failed to object to the alleged lack 
of access or failed to make a record of his objection. In eithe 
instance, he has failed to provide this Court with a record to 
support his claim. This Court then presumes regularity in the 
proceedings below. State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 
1985). 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REJECTING 
CERTAIN OF DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
Defendant next claims error in the trial court's 
refusal to submit two of his proposed jury instructions to the 
jury. Those instruction both deal with the concept of reasonable 
4 
alternative hypothesis (R. at 964-65 and 975). Defendant placed 
his objections to the exclusion of these two instructions on the 
record after the jury was instructed and had retired to 
deliberate (R. 1357 at 1372-73). The record does not disclose 
the trial court's rejection of, or reason for rejecting, the 
proposed instructions. Since defendant has failed to provide a 
record as to the court's reason for rejecting the instructions, 
this Court could decline to further address the issue. State v. 
Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988). Even if the Court does 
review the issue, defendant's claim is without merit. 
4 
Only one paragraph was omitted from defendant's proposed 
instruction at page 964 of the record. Defendant challenges only 
the omission of that paragraph in that instruction. 
While some aspects of jury instructions are within the 
discretion of the trial court, State v. Standiford/ 769 P.2d 254, 
266 (Utah 1988) ("framing of instructions lies in the trial 
judge's discretion"), "[t]he trial court has a duty to instruct 
the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the case." State 
v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981). Because the record does 
not demonstrate the reason that the court rejected the proposed 
instructions, it is unclear whether the rejection was a 
discretionary matter or a legal conclusion. Discretionary 
matters are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984). Legal 
conclusions are reviewed for correctness. City of Monticello v. 
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied, 111 S.Ct. 
120 (1990). 
"Instructions generally ought to be drafted with a view 
to assisting the jury to understand the issues they have to 
decide." Standiford, 769 P.2d at 266. Included in the duty to 
instruct on the law applicable to the facts of the case is "the 
right of the defendant to have his theory of the case presented 
to the jury in a clear and understandable way." Potter, 627 P.2d 
at 78 (footnote omitted). The trial court is not obligated to 
give a requested instruction unless the instruction accurately 
states the law. State v. Wilcox, 28 Utah 2d 71, 498 P.2d 357, 
359 (1972). Also, M[i]t is not error to refuse a proposed 
instruction if the point is properly covered in the other 
instructions." State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 647 (Utah 1982) 
(citations omitted). See also State v. Miller, 727 P.2d 203, 206 
(Utah 1986). 
The instruction issue presented in this case was 
addressed by this Court in State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 
1989). Parsons argued "that the trial court erred in refusing to 
instruct the jury on the 'two reasonable hypotheses' theory• " 
Id. at 1285. Citing an earlier case, this Court stated: 
In Larocco, we held, "An instruction on 
reasonable alternative hypothesis is not 
required, even when the evidence is solely 
circumstantial." . . . Thus, choosing not to 
give the instruction is squarely within the 
discretion of the court. 
The prosecution's burden of proof in any 
criminal case, whether the evidence be direct 
or circumstantial, or a combination of both, 
is that of beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
use of the reasonable alternative hypothesis 
instruction is merely one way of expressing 
that necessary burden of proof and there is 
no apparent reason to mandate that one, and 
only one, particular instruction be used by 
trial judges in conveying to the jury the 
meaning of that elusive phrase, "proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt." . . . In any event, the 
"reasonable doubt" instruction given in the 
instant case clearly and appropriately 
informed the jury of the legal standard to be 
applied. 
Id. at 1285-86 (quoting State v. Larocco, 665 P.2d 1272, 1273 
(Utah 1983)) (emphasis in original) (other citation omitted). 
The trial court gave legally sufficient instructions 
regarding the presumption of innocence (R. at 1015), the 
prosecution's burden of proof (R. at 1016-17), the definition of 
direct and circumstantial evidence (R. at 1018), and the 
5 
reconciliation of conflicting evidence (R. at 1019). These 
instructions properly advised the jury of the legal standards to 
Copies of these instructions are attached as Addendum A. 
be applied. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
rejecting defendant's proposed "reasonable alternative 
hypothesisM instructions. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant's final claim is that the trial court erred 
in denying his motions for new trial. On May 26, 1989, defendant 
filed a motion for new trial, alleging, inter alia, that a 
witness was found who would testify about the position of the 
door lock on defendant's car when it is in a locked position (R. 
at 1240-46). After a hearing on this motion (Transcript of 
hearing July 26, 1989 [hereafter T. 7/26/89]), the court denied 
it (R. at 1326-31; a copy of the court's order, findings of fact, 
and conclusions of law are attached as Addendum B). The trial 
court's file does not contain any other motion for new trial; 
however, another one obviously was filed after the matter was 
transmitted on appeal. The transcript of the proceedings on the 
second motion is included in the record as a supplemental 
transcript of hearings conducted April 5 and 17, 1990 (Transcript 
of hearings April 5, 1990 [hereafter T. 4/5/90], and April 17, 
1990 [hereafter T. 4/17/90]). This last motion for new trial was 
based on defendant's allegation that he had discovered an inmate 
Defendant also alleged that the verdict was improper because 
one juror did not believe that defendant had intentionally or 
knowingly killed his baby. Defendant does not raise that point 
on appeal and, consequently, has abandoned it. An amended motion 
for new trial, filed May 30, 1989, and challenging the authority 
of the prosecutors to act in their office, has also not been 
raised on appeal and thus should be considered abandoned. (R. at 
1252-53). 
at the prison who was willing to testify that Ron Peterson, a 
State's witness, had testified falsely at trial (T. 4/5/90 at 2). 
H[T]he decision to grant or deny a new trial is a 
matter of discretion with the trial court and will not be 
reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. 
Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985). In order to "constitute 
a ground for a new trial, newly discovered evidence must meet the 
following criteria: 
(1) It must be such as could not with 
reasonable diligence have been discovered and 
produced at the trial; (2) it must not be 
merely cumulative; (3) it must be such as to 
render a different result probable on the 
retrial of the case." 
State v. Conrad, 590 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Utah 1979) (quoting State 
v. Gellatly, 22 Utah 2d 149, 449 P.2d 993 (1969)). "Generally, 
newly discovered impeachment evidence does not ordinarily warrant 
a new trial." State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 1988) 
(citations omitted). The evidence defendant now claims as basis 
for a new trial could have been discovered before trial, is 
cumulative, is impeachment evidence, and is not likely to render 
a different result on retrial. 
In reference to the evidence of the door lock, the 
trial court found that that evidence was discoverable before 
trial and was not critical to the jury's verdict (R. at 1328 and 
T. 7/26/89 at 10-11). Defendant did not call any witnesses at 
the hearing on his first motion for new trial, relying instead on 
affidavits and his restatement of the material presented in the 
affidavits (R. at 1287-96 and 1301-1303 and T. 7/26/89 at 2-5). 
Those affidavits indicate that defendant told his counsel during 
trial that an examination of the car from which defendant claims 
his child was taken would show that the photograph which was 
Exhibit 66 showed the driver's door lock in an unlocked position 
(R. at 1288). Attempts to locate the car, which had been sold 
after defendant's arrest, were unavailing until after trial (R. 
at 1289). 
The court did not abuse its discretion in determining 
that defendant could have obtained this information before trial 
and that it was not critical to the jury's verdict. A search for 
the car could have been conducted before trial; the information 
was not difficult to obtain and did not take an inordinate amount 
of time to obtain (R. at 1288-89). Whether the door was locked 
or unlocked is not an issue which would probably affect the 
result if this matter were to be retried. The State's theory is 
that the child was not in the car when defendant went in to Osco 
Drug; it is immaterial to defendant's conviction whether he left 
the door locked or unlocked. Even given defendant's claim that 
the baby was taken from the car, the position of the door lock is 
insignificant in the face of the overwhelming circumstantial 
evidence supporting defendant's conviction. 
Even though the court did not address the issue of the 
cumulative nature of this testimony in his ruling, this Court may 
affirm the trial court's decision on this separate ground. State 
v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 157, 160 (Utah 1985) (appellate court "may 
affirm on any proper grounds, even though the trial court 
assigned another reason for its ruling"). Defendant testified 
that Exhibit 66 showed the door in an unlocked position (R. 1355 
at 1056). The evidence proffered in the affidavits in support of 
the motion for new trial was merely cumulative. The proffered 
evidence also was contradicted by the testimony of Marthan 
Ferguson, who saw a blonde girl walk to defendant's car and try 
to open the driver's door (R. 1353 at 597). 
To the extent that defendant offered the door lock 
evidence to impeach the testimony of a police officer (Br. of 
App. at 50), impeachment evidence is not proper grounds for 
granting a new trial. The issue of the car door lock does not 
support a new trial because it is cumulative, offered for 
impeachment, and does not raise the likelihood of a different 
result on retrial. 
No motion, written order, findings, or conclusions 
appear in the record for defendant's second motion for new trial. 
Defendant apparently based that motion on allegations that 
Kenneth Lisner, an inmate at the prison, had approached defendant 
and told defendant that Ron Peterson had admitted lying at 
defendant's trial (T. 4/5/90 at 2 and 5). That evidence was 
offered as impeachment of Peterson's testimony (T. 4/5/90 at 6). 
The hearing then turned to a discussion of defendant's failure to 
call as a witness Jon Lippencott, the person Peterson testified 
defendant told about having killed his child (T. 4/5/90 at 14-
33). Rather than continue to argue the statement of Lisner about 
Peterson's alleged statement to Lisner, defendant asked the court 
to continue the matter. The continuance was sought to allow 
defendant to procure the attendance of Lippencott in order to 
refute Peterson's testimony. The motion to continue was granted 
(T. 4/5/90 at 33-34). 
Defendant was unable to secure Lippencott's attendance 
when the court recalled the matter on April 17, 1989. Neither 
was defendant able to assure the court that Lippencott would 
appear if the matter was further continued. The motion for 
further continuance was denied (T. 4/17/90 at 2-3 and 13-14). 
The court then entered verbal findings and conclusions in denying 
defendant's second motion for new trial (T. 4/17/90 at 15-16). 
The court determined that the evidence had been available to 
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defendant prior to trial (T. 4/17/90 at 15). Second, the court 
determined that the proffered evidence would be cumulative; "that 
it would result in nothing more than a push and pull match 
between prisoners. . . . And that verbal tug-of-war could endure 
indefinitely" (T. 4/17/90 at 15). 
Finally, the court concluded that the proffered 
evidence would not result in a different result on retrial. The 
court said: 
The defendant, in the Court's opinion, was 
not convicted on the testimony of Ronald 
Peterson. The defendant was convicted on an 
exceptionally strong circumstantial evidence 
case. Historically, circumstantial evidence 
has been as persuasive as direct evidence. 
The Court heard the testimony day after day 
after day, regarding the allegations against 
the defendant. The Court finds that the 
tests for newly discovered evidence relating 
to a new trial do not exist. Even if they 
did exist, the Court agrees totally and 
completely with the jury verdict rendered in 
this case, and is absolutely of the opinion 
that the outcome of this case would have not 
been any different whether Ron Peterson 
testified or not. For that, all of those 
reasons, and all of those findings, the Court 
The record does not indicate whether the evidence the court 
was referring to was the testimony of Lippencott or of Lisner. 
denies the defendant's motion for a new 
trial. 
(T. 4/17/90 at 16). Defendant has not demonstrated to this Court 
that the trial court's decision was an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction. 
J 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this JZ- day of January, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ > 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, and a defendant is innocent until he is 
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. You are Instructed that 
the State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether 
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an 
acquittal. 
INSTRUCTION NO. |Q« 
A person charged with a crime is presumed to be innocent 
until he/she is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
presumption of innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded by the 
jury at pleasure, but is a substantial/ essential part of the law 
and is binding upon the jury. This presumption is a humane 
provision of the law, intended, so far as human agency is capable, 
to guard against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly 
punished* 
The presumption of innocence must continue to prevail in 
the minds of the jury unless and until the jury is satisfied beyond 
a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. And in case of a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt he/she is entitled to 
an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the 
State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Mow, 
by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based on reason and one 
which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind 
and convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act 
conscientiously upon it. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which 
reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from the 
evidence or the lack of evidence in this case. 
It a f t e r an i m p a r t i a l c o n . i u o r a t 1 o n <%*%<! c o m p a c l i u n o t « n 
the ev idence in the case you can candidly say tha t you are not 
s a t i s f i e d of the defendants g u i l t , you have a reasonable doubt. 
But i f a f ter such impartial considerat ion and comparison of 
a l l the evidence you can truthfully say that you have an abiding 
convict ion of the defendant's g u i l t such as you wi l l be wi l l ing to 
act upon in the m-e-f-e weighty and important matters relat ing to your 
own a f f a i r s , you have no reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt must 




Two Masses of evidence are recognized and admitted in 
courts of justice, upon either or both of which, juries lawfully 
may base their findings, whether favorable to the State or to the 
defendant, provided, however, that to support a verdict of guilt 
that evidence, whether of one kind or the other or a combination 
of both, must carry the convincing quality required by law. 
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other as 
circumstantial. The law makes no distinction between the two 
classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to 
their effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each for 
such convincing force as it may carry and accepts each as a 
reasonable method of proof. 
Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in 
question consists of the testimony of every witness who, with any 
of his or her own physical senses, perceived such conduct or any 
part thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what thus 
was perceived. All other evidence admitted in the trial is 
circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and insofar as it 
shows any act, statement or other conduct, or any circumstance of 
fact, tending to prove by reasonable inference the innocence or 
guilt of the defendant, it may be considered by you in arriving at 
a verdict. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12. 
Where there Is a conflict In the evidence you should 
reconcile such conflict as far as you reasonably can. But where 
the conflict cannot be reconciled, you are the final Judges and 
must determine from the evidence what the facts are. There are 
no definite rules governing how you shall determine the weight or 
convincing force of any evidence, or how you shall determine what 
the facts In this case are. But you should carefully and 
conscientiously consider and compare all of the testimony, and 
all of the facts and circumstances, which have a bearing on any 
issue, and determine therefrom what the facts are. You are not 
bound to believe all that the witnesses have testified to or any 
witness or class of witnesses unless such testimony is reasonable 
and convincing In view of all of the facts and circumstances In 
evidence. You may believe one witness as against many, or many 
as against a fewer number In accordance with your honest 
convictions. The testimony of a witness known to have made false 
statements on one matter is naturally less convincing on other 
matters. So If you believe a wltnoss has willfully testified 
falsely as to any material fact in this case, you may disregard 
the whole of the testimony of such witness, or you may give It 
such weight as you think It is entitled to. 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
JAMES, STEVEN RAY 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 891900667 FS 
DATE 07/26/89 
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN 
COURT REPORTER BRAD YOUNG 
COURT CLERK EHM 
TYPE OF HEARING: MOTION HEARING 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. JENKINS, JAMES 
D. ATTY. GUTKE, ROBERT WW 
THIS MATTER COMES NOW BEFORE THE COURT FOR A HEARING ON 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. THE MOTION IS ARGUED AND 
SUBMITTED. THE COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS: 
THE MOTION THAT NEW TRIAL BE GRANTED BECAUSE CRITICAL 
EVIDENCE HAD NOT BEEN PRESENTED IS DENIED. 
THE MOTION THAT NEW TRIAL BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE COUNTY 
ATTORNEY HAD BEEN IMPROPERLY APPOINTED OR SWORN IN IS 
DENIED. 
THE MOTION THAT A NEW TRIAL BE GRANTED BECAUSE A JUROR 
ALLEDGED DOUBT IS DENIED. 
THE COURT RULES THAT A SETTLEMENT TRY TO BE REACHED THROUGH 
PROPER COUNTY CHANNELS ON THE MOTION THAT FUNDS BE PROVIDED FOR 
EXPERT ASSISTANCE. 
AUG 7 1989 
James C. Jenkins 
Deputy Cache County 
110 North 100 West 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(801) 752-8920 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S 
) MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, 
) Case No. 891900667 
Defendant. 
This matter having come before the Court on Defendant's 
Motion for New Trial and the Court having reviewed the pleadings 
herein submitted by the parties and after a hearing before this 
Court on July 26, 1989 at 10:00 a.m. wherein the defendant was 
personally present and represented by counsel and the State was 
present and represented by counsel and the Court having been 
fully advised in the premises; now therefore the Court makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant has sought a new trial on three grounds. Each 
will be separately addressed herein. 
2. With respect to the first ground, that being a claim of 
newly discovered evidence concerning the position of the 
defendant's door lock, such does not justify a motion for new 
trial. The Court specifically finds that the allegations 
Attorney i*^ ciw* 
concerning whether the door lock was in a locked position was 
discoverable before trial, and furthermore, whether or not the 
door was in a locked position is not critical to the jury's 
verdict* As a matter of law, the standard by which a new trial 
is granted requires that the alleged new evidence must have a 
substantial adverse effect on the rights of a party warranting a 
new trial. The Court was present throughout the entire trial 
proceedings, heard all of the evidence presented to the jury, and 
this Court finds that a determination of whether the door lock 
was in a locked or unlocked position at the time in question does 
not have a substantial adverse effect on the rights of the 
defendant. Therefore, the motion for a new trial should be 
denied. 
3. The second basis for a new trial alleged by the 
defendant is that the verdict does not represent the finding of 
the trial juror Valerie McCoy. The Court finds that the 
allegations on this issue asserted by the defendant are not a 
justifiable basis for a new trial. The Affidavit of Ms. Barton-
Coombs is inadmissable under the law and therefore cannot be 
received as a basis for consideration. Additionally, the 
affidavit submitted by the subject juror is clearly contrary to 
the allegations of the defendant. The Court finds that the jury 
entered its verdict properly, that at the request of the 
defendant each juror was personally polled as to whether the 
verdict represented each juror's finding in the case, and the 
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subject juror specifically stated in open Court that the verdict 
was her verdict. The Court further finds that as a matter of law 
under Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence and the case law 
as articulated in State v. Couch, 635 P. 2d 89 (Utah 1981) a new 
trial should not be granted under the circumstances asserted by 
the defendant. A new trial therefore should be denied. 
4. With respect to the final claim of defendant for new 
trial, that being the allegation that the prosecuting attorneys 
were not lawfully entitled to prosecute the matter, this Court 
finds that such is not a basis for a new trial. The Court 
specifically finds that the objection to the legal status of the 
prosecuting attorneys was not timely raised. Furthermore, this 
Court finds that from the evidence presented, the prosecuting 
attorneys were properly appointed and acting in their official 
capacity at the time of trial, and specifically finds that Mr. 
Jenkins, who was lead counsel for the State was appointed and 
took office as Deputy County Attorney of Cache County on October 
2, 1982, and that Mr. Burbank was appointed and took the oath of 
office on September 20, 1983. The Court further finds that as a 
matter of law that defendant's allegations with respect to the 
authority of the prosecutor does not justify a new trial. 
Therefore, a new trial should not be granted. 
DATED this 7 day of August, 1989. 





AUG 7 1989 
James C. Jenkins 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
110 North 100 West 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(801) 752-8920 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, 
Defendant. ' 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
1 MOTION FOR MEW TRIAL 
Case No. 891900667 
This matter having come before the Court on Defendant's 
Motion and Amended Motion for a Nev; Trial and the Court having 
reviewed the pleadings herein and the evidence submitted and 
having heard the arguments of counsel at a hearing held July 26, 
1989 at 10:00 a.m. before the above entitled Court, and the Court 
further having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, now therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for a New Trial 
be and the same hereby is denied. 
DATED this ^ day of August, 1989. 
DapiiV Clark 
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